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Abstract The past few decades have witnessed a signifi-
cant increase in the number of cross-border strategic
alliances among firms. We focus on the role of alliance
expertise (alliance experience and diversity of partners) and
alliance governance (horizontal vs. vertical alliances and
joint venture vs. other alliances) in global innovation
generation. We also examine the effect of these variables
on the financial performance of the focal firm. The
conceptual model is tested using an empirical analysis of
cross-border alliances formed by U.S. pharmaceutical
companies from 1985 to 2008. We find that while prior
alliance experience has a positive association with global
innovation generation, diversity of partners has a negative
relationship. In addition, whether the alliance is horizontal
or vertical has no bearing on the innovation generation, but
joint ventures are associated with more global innovation
generation than other types of alliances. Finally, as global
innovation generation increases, financial performance
increases up to a point but thereafter exhibits a negative
relationship.
Keywords Business-to-business relationships . Strategic
alliances . Global innovation generation . Financial
performance . Pharmaceutical industry
Introduction
Globalization and technological advances have resulted in a
significant reconfiguration of cross-border business-to-
business relationships and the way these relationships
contribute to organizational functioning and performance.
The locus of such business-to-business relationships and
the impact of such relationships in organizational activities,
such as innovation generation and customer relationship
management, have taken on a global perspective. With the
advent of the “flat world” (Friedman 2005) and a “tectonic
shift” (Sheth and Sisodia 2006) in the way markets and
organizations interact in the global setting, organizations
can now collaborate “seamlessly” across countries and time
zones. Although there are several examples of successful
alliances (e.g., Inkpen 2005; Inkpen and Wang 2006), if
they are not designed, understood, and managed well,
transaction costs (Coase 1937; Williamson 1985) can make
knowledge transfer and global innovation generation
activities both costly and ultimately lead to poor financial
performance. For example, outsourcing contracts have been
cancelled in several instances (e.g., Corcoran 2004), and the
benefits of such arrangements over the long run for both
knowledge creation and financial output have been ques-
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tioned (Harland et al. 2005). Good alliance management
can result in innovation generation (Rothaermel and Hess
2010), but whether alliance management alone leads to firm
performance or whether innovation is a precursor to
financial performance is unknown. Thus, both academic
research and practice can benefit from a careful examina-
tion of the alliance characteristics and the effect of
globalization of innovation activity on firms’ performance.
This study focuses on two key research questions: (1) Are
alliance expertise and alliance governance related to the focal
firm’s global innovation generation? and (2) Does the
relationship between alliance characteristics and global
innovation generation affect the firm’s financial performance?
We next briefly describe the substantive and managerial
context of these research questions and delineate the relevance
and timeliness of the need for research in this domain.
Business-to-business relationships in the value chain are
central to the domain of marketing (Boyd and Spekman 2008;
Ghosh and John 2005; Swaminathan and Moorman 2009),
as is the creation of value through global innovation in
alliances, including buyer-seller relationships (Roy et al.
2004; Wilson 1995). Marketing scholars have focused a
great deal on the downstream aspects of the new product
development (NPD) process, including studying distribution
and branding (Nygaard and Dahlstrom 2002; Rust et al.
2004), while upstream strategy processes corresponding to
idea generation and alliance structure and governance have
been largely left to strategy scholars, resulting in a decline in
marketing’s influence on firm strategy formulation (Day
1992; Kerin 1992; Varadarajan 1992). This decline of
marketing’s influence on strategy has continued (Chandy
2003), and examining the organizing mechanisms for
innovation has been a challenge for marketing scholars
(Hauser et al. 2006). The current research answers calls for
further research in marketing to examine organizational
issues and particularly upstream alliances for early stages
of the NPD process, such as idea generation, access of global
markets through innovation, and the impact of these strategic
actions on firm’s financial performance (Han et al. 2001).
Previous conceptualizations of global innovation gener-
ation in business-to-business relationships have recognized
that knowledge flow takes place from firm to alliance to
markets (Almeida et al. 2002). Today, global outsourcing of
services is rapidly increasing. Typically, outsourcing begins
as a market transaction, and given the “sticky” nature of
tasks (in our context, the word “sticky” means that the
knowledge is ingrained in the organizational culture and
routines and it is difficult to acquire, transfer, and use (von
Hippel 1994)), these relationships become alliances over
time because of the breadth of collaboration. Thus,
knowledge flow in firms may follow a path such as
markets → alliances → firms (e.g., Daksh acquired by
IBM; Slater 2004). Converting an alliance into ownership
can be a major distraction for focal firms. In contrast,
markets are incapable of combining sticky knowledge, and
therefore good alliances that work can be an ideal midpoint.
Understanding how alliances function in terms of global
innovation generation and impact financial performance can
provide valuable insight into the forms of governance that
allow for the effective cross-border transfer of knowledge.
Over the past two decades, there has been increasing
scholarly interest in international alliances and the creation
of knowledge (Simonin 2004). These alliances have been
examined in the context of important issues, such as the
role of culture (Bhagat et al. 2002; Morosini et al. 1998),
the need to transfer personnel (Almeida and Kogut 1997),
the stickiness and adaptation of new knowledge generated
(Jensen and Szulanski 2004), the path dependence of new
knowledge generated (Song et al. 2003), and NPD activities
and global innovation generation (e.g., Wind and Mahajan
1997; Wuyts et al. 2004). Nonetheless, the relationship
between globalization of innovation in the context of
alliance activities and how they are related to firms’
financial performance have not been explored. This article
addresses these important issues using global innovation
generation as a study context.
The article makes several unique contributions. First, by
studying the role of alliance characteristics in global
innovation generation, we expand our knowledge of
alliance management in influencing globalization of inno-
vation activity. Second, by linking the alliance character-
istics and global innovation generation to financial
performance, we highlight the role of these factors in the
financial performance of the focal firm. Third, by focusing
our empirical analysis on the pharmaceutical industry, we
add a sectoral dimension to our research. In recent years
(e.g., Rothaermel and Hess 2010; Yeniyurt et al. 2009),
practitioners as well as academic researchers have high-
lighted the importance of the pharmaceutical industry to the
world and U.S. economies and to the knowledge-intensive
nature of the early stage of NPD.
The rest of the article is organized as follows: We present
our conceptual framework and a model of alliance
characteristics, global innovation generation, and financial
performance. Next, we develop hypotheses that link global
innovation generation with both alliance activity and firms’
financial performance. Then, we present our empirical
analyses and discuss the results. We conclude with a
discussion of the theoretical implications and managerial
usefulness of our findings and future research directions.
Conceptual framework
We conceptualize that the focal firm’s alliance expertise
characteristics and alliance governance characteristics are
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related to its global innovation generation, the key feature
of our framework. In turn, the firm’s global innovation
generation and alliance characteristics are related to the
focal firm’s financial performance. Our framework under-
scores the possibility that the alliance characteristics can
have a direct relationship to the firm’s financial perfor-
mance as well as an indirect relationship through the
alliance characteristics’ relationship to global innovation
generation. In summary, the framework focuses on the
following links:
(1) alliance characteristics→ global innovation generation,
(2) global innovation generation → financial performance,
and
(3) alliance characteristics → financial performance.
We present our conceptual model of alliance character-
istics, global innovation generation, and financial perfor-
mance in Fig. 1. In essence, the framework shows two
models: one in which global innovation generation is the
focal outcome construct and one in which the outcome is
the focal firms’ financial performance. Note that our model
represents the notion that the total effect of alliance
characteristics on financial performance comprises two
components: the indirect component that operates through
the mediating variable of global innovation generation and
the direct component that operates as a direct link to
performance.
Given the complex nature of business-to-business rela-
tionships in the context of innovation generation, rather
than one theory, we use three relevant theories to discuss
the hypotheses. In our model, we view the direct effects of
alliance expertise and governance on firm performance
from the perspectives of transaction cost analysis (TCA)
and the resource-based view (RBV) of the firm (Barney
1991; Morgan and Hunt 1994; Williamson 1985). Concep-
tually, TCA in the alliance context is the ability of partners
to work effectively together based on experience with prior
alliances with the same or different partners. RBV in our
conceptual context involves the physical and explicit skill
resources that partners bring to the alliance. These
resources and skills are complementary between partners
and in combination can deliver better performance for the
alliance. TCA explicitly views the firm as a governance
structure, whereas the RBV perceives it strictly as a
production function (Rindfleisch and Heide 1997). For
understanding the indirect effects of alliance expertise and
alliance governance through global innovation generation,
we also draw on the conceptual dimensions of the
knowledge-based view (KBV) of the firm (Grant and
Badden-Fuller 1995). The KBV perspective on alliances
involves the domain and execution knowledge of the
alliance partners that goes beyond the explicit consider-
ations of RBV. Knowledge can be combined and lead to
innovation (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995). Thus, our
research uses TCA and the RBV as overarching theories,
while integrating the KBV in the formulation of our
hypotheses related to global innovation generation. We
view relationship marketing theory as a derivative of the
TCA approach. We next provide a brief discussion of each
construct in our model.
Global innovation generation
Conceptually, global innovation generation can take place
in a foreign market in the early stages of the NPD process,
including idea generation and concept selection (Gilbert
and Newbery 1982; Han et al. 2001), or in the later stages,
including international marketing-type adaptations in
branding, packaging, or distribution (Lee and O’Connor
2003). Our focus is on the innovation outcome in upstream
alliances or early stages of the innovation process.
Global innovation generation and larger macro con-
structs, such as knowledge transfer and globalization of
innovation, have engaged strategy scholars since the 1990s
(e.g., Gulati 1995). This scholarly focus has increased given
the importance of the KBV in understanding firm strategies
and performance (Grant and Badden-Fuller 1995; Kogut
and Zander 1993). Within this literature stream, scholars
have investigated the kinds of alliances that might help or
hinder knowledge transfer, including joint ventures (JVs),
research-and-development (R&D) alliances at the same
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arrangements (Dahlstrom et al. 1996). Since the turn of the
millennium, global outsourcing and alliances in knowledge-
intensive industries have become prominent in managing
innovation generation. Thus, the focus of our theoretical
development and empirical testing is the role of alliance
expertise and alliance governance in effective innovation
generation for the focal firm and, in turn, their effect on the
focal firm’s financial performance.
Alliance characteristics
At the level of the single alliance, Kale and Singh (2009, p.
48) provide a taxonomy of the key success factors around
the phases of the alliance life cycle. These life-cycle stages
are alliance formation and partner selection, alliance
governance and design, and post-formation alliance man-
agement. Given marketing scholars’ intense scrutiny of
post-formation alliance management, we extend a market-
ing view to the early stages of Kale and Singh’s taxonomy
through alliance formation and partner selection and
alliance governance and design. In the former, we investi-
gate alliance expertise, and in the latter, we examine
alliance governance. Thus, our study complements the
current research while extending it in a significant way.
Alliance expertise
Alliance expertise refers to the focal firm’s expertise in
managing cross-border alliances effectively. Management
of inter-firm alliances is a skill that has sparked many high-
tech companies to create an alliance management function.
For example, Gueth et al. (2001) report that Eli Lily was an
early implementer of the formal alliance management
function. We conceptualize two dimensions of alliance
expertise—namely, alliance experience and diversity of
partners.
Alliance experience The level of alliance experience is
captured through the frequency of partnering or the number
of alliance partners a firm has. Alliances for R&D involve
partnerships in which firms come together to share
complementary know-how in fast-changing fields (Powell
1998; Powell et al. 1996), such as the high-tech, financial
services, and pharmaceutical industries. Such collaborations
enable the joint deployment of efforts and resources in
fields that are changing and have great competitive
pressure. Managing several alliances aids the firm in
developing its alliance expertise.
Diversity of partners The diversity of partners refers to
collaborations on projects with different partners (Wuyts et
al. 2004). Uzzi (1997) suggests that having diverse partners
enhances the vision of both partners and may help in
innovation. Along the same lines, in the hard disk drive
industry, Christensen (1997) finds that new suppliers were
the ones that helped innovation. While diverse partners can
enhance new knowledge, they can also lead to lesser
efficiency and trust during the establishment of routines
(Gulati and Kletter 2005).
Alliance Governance
Alliance governance comprises the mechanisms, both
contractual and ownership (Contractor and Lorange 2002),
that enable the focal firm to generate innovations and
increase financial performance. We conceptualize alliance
governance as vertical versus horizontal alliances and JV
versus other types of alliances.
Vertical versus horizontal alliances Strategic alliances
involve contractual interdependence with partners either
vertically or horizontally (Rindfleisch 2000). Vertical
relationships in the upstream value chain of the focal firm
(Dyer 1996; Lorenzoni and Lipparini 1999) involve firms
that supply equipment, raw materials, components, or input
services. Horizontal relationships at a similar point of the
value chain (Ahuja 2000; Jap 1999) involve firms in the
same industry but in different niches. In these strategic
arrangements, the focal firm may collaborate with a series
of suppliers, as in the auto industry (Clark and Fujimoto
1991) or the pharmaceutical and software industries
(Hagedoorn 1993). The nature of such interdependence is
that the two firms do not compete for exactly the same
customers. Thus, for example, Coca-Cola may have a
strategic alliance with Nestlé in markets in which they both
target different sets of customers.
JVs versus other alliances Joint ventures are another form
of alliance governance that has been studied extensively
(Inkpen and Beamish 1997). International JVs are known to
have high failure rates and high management costs (Kogut
1988; Porter 1987), challenges in sharing proprietary
knowledge, and the “appetite for control” (Hagedoorn
2002) between partners.
Despite these well-known problems, JVs allow direct
control by the focal firm and better management of
intellectual property and innovation generation (Das and
Teng 2000). Similarly, increased opportunities for moni-
toring and control allow for better financial performance
(Fang et al. 2008).
Financial performance
Our outcome variable in the investigation of alliance
expertise, alliance governance, and global innovation
generation is firm financial performance. In the second
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stage of our model (Fig. 1), we investigate the direct impact
of global innovation generation on financial performance.
We also investigate the impact of alliance expertise and
alliance governance on financial performance.
Development of hypotheses
Alliance characteristics and firm performance
The total effect of each alliance characteristic on financial
performance derives from the indirect effect through the
mediating construct of global innovation generation, as well
as any remaining residual effect from the direct effect. The
following discussion pertains to the total effect of each
alliance characteristic on financial performance.
Number of global alliance partners and firm financial
performance By dealing with many alliance partners,
focal firms learn how to manage partners from routines,
systems, and the atmosphere of the relationship (Gadde
2004). This firm learning is about managing inter-firm
relationships and follows indirectly from TCA theory.
Although dealing with the same partner reduces transac-
tion costs, the aggregate transaction costs for every new
partner or portfolio of partners decrease as the focal firm
becomes used to managing partners. This ability to better
manage alliances leads to better financial performance
(Sarkar et al. 2001b).
There is growing evidence (Anand and Khanna 2000;
Kale et al. 2002) that alliance expertise positively affects
firm performance. For example, Hoang and Rothaermel
(2005) find that general alliance management skills posi-
tively affect the performance of the joint project. Hoffmann
(2005) suggests that a portfolio of alliances and an alliance
management function should result in improved financial
performance.
According to the RBV perspective, firms that deal with
several partners gain access to a variety of skills and
capabilities that can affect research productivity positively
(Deeds and Hill 1996; Shan et al. 1994) and result in better
financial performance. In a similar vein, Mahajan et al.
(2002) argue that winners of the 2000 dot-com bust should
have had more alliances. The theoretical rationale is
compelling in that merely having the experience of
managing many alliances enhances the focal firm’s ability
to produce results and increase financial performance.
Thus, we posit that experience with a large number of
partners should help the focal firm’s financial performance.
H1: As the number of partners in the focal firm’s past
alliances increases, the total effect on financial
performance increases.
Diversity of partners and firm financial performance From
an RBV perspective, we conceptualize diversity of partners
in our formulation as a partnership between firms with
complementary skills and resources (Sarkar et al. 2001a).
The partners trust each other’s competence (Sako 1992)
before contracting and therefore try to work together as a
team to contribute to business results. The ability to bring in
a diverse partner and assimilate the skills and resources for
better financial performance has become more important in
a globalized, technologically connected world.
From a TCA perspective, when partners can specify in
advance the complementary skills and resources they bring
to the relationship and clearly articulate mutual expect-
ations, there is little dispute as joint work gets underway.
After initial transaction costs are lowered through aware-
ness and exploration (Dwyer et al. 1987), the partners
develop commitment and an ability to work together
effectively. Underlying the diversity of partners is the
alliance expertise skill a focal firm develops. The firm
formulates processes and routines that enable it to develop
transaction-specific investments to improve the perfor-
mance (Yu et al. 2006).
H2: As the diversity of partners in a firm’s past alliances
increases, the total effect on financial performance
increases.
Vertical versus horizontal alliances and firm financial
performance Vertical alliances involve supply by an up-
stream supplier to the downstream focal firm or supply by
the focal firm to a downstream partner. Transaction cost
theorists (e.g., Williamson 1985) have argued that the
reduction of transaction costs involves an association with a
supplier in which both parties develop a long-term
relationship of commitment and trust (Morgan and Hunt
1994). Competition is minimal between vertical partners, and
the emphasis is on building an efficient, agile, and responsive
supply chain (Christopher 2000). Such vertical alliances
develop familiarity and routines to deal with the downstream
partner and enhance efficiencies. This enhanced efficiency
results in better financial performance for the focal firm.
We conceptualize horizontal strategic alliances as occur-
ring at the same point in the value chain (Nygaard and
Dahlstrom 2002; Rindfleisch 2000). However, when we
compare horizontal and vertical alliances, horizontal alli-
ances have a competition element that should decrease the
overall performance impact on the focal firm. For example,
horizontal alliances can create competitive feelings of
rivalry, and such feelings will ultimately result in reduced
financial performance. For example, Gimeno (2004 p. 822)
finds that because of rivalry in the airline industry,
horizontal alliances are favored only when partners “co-
specialize” or invest in partner specific assets. When
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horizontal alliances become formalized as mergers, assets
of the target firm may be divested, and such divesture can
also lead to lower financial performance (Capron 1999;
Capron and Hulland 1999). In contrast, vertical relation-
ships are clear-cut in terms of resources, skills, and buyer-
seller relationship building.
From the perspective of RBV, vertical alliances provide
the context in which the exchange of critical complemen-
tary skills and information can occur (Achrol 1991) and can
bring different sets of resources and capabilities to the
partnership. In contrast, horizontal partners compete for the
same resources in the same market (Lieberman and
Montgomery 1998). Thus, we hypothesize the following:
H3: As the proportion of vertical alliances relative to the
total number of alliances increases (compared to
horizontal alliances), the total effect on financial
performance increases.
JVs and firm financial performance Historically, JVs have
been the preferred method of international market entry
(Ekeledo and Sivakumar 1998) because of the appropriate
level of monitoring and control the focal firm can exercise
in its foreign operations that also govern its financial
performance. The RBV suggests that JV partners come
together with different sets of resources and capabilities that
enhance the relationship; this is especially the case in a
technologically turbulent environment (Song et al. 2003).
Such international JV alliances show improved financial
performance, and according to Lyles and Salk (1996), the
RBV is an appropriate theoretical lens to study the
performance of international JVs.
In addition, JVs provide the context in which strong
social contracts between the firms can be developed.
Consistent with the TCA framework (Williamson 1985),
in light of the social contract, the general effect of
monitoring on a party’s behavior is a reduction in
opportunism (Heide et al. 2007), resulting in an improve-
ment in the focal firm’s financial performance.
With their range of objectives such as market entry,
distribution, NPD, and R&D, JVs have become common.
The TCA perspective (Kogut and Singh 1988) suggests that
a JV allows for direct monitoring and control by each
partner through formal board membership and sometimes
partnership in managing day-to-day operations. Despite the
well-known tensions surrounding JV governance (Fryxell et
al. 2002), research suggests that both RBV and TCA
perspectives explain the positive correlation between the
JV form of alliances and firm financial performance. For
example, Fang et al. (2008) studied Chinese JVs and found
that the partners’ resource deployments enhanced financial
performance. We theorize that the focal firm improves its
performance because the overall JV’s performance
improves through the use of social contracts structured
through both formal board meetings and daily operations.
With this theorizing, we argue that the overall performance
impact of JVs is positive. Thus, we hypothesize the
following:
H4: As the proportion of JV alliances relative to the total
number of alliances increases, the total effect on
financial performance increases.
Alliance expertise and global innovation generation
Number of global alliance partners and global innovation
generation Using a TCA perspective, we define alliance
experience as the past experience of the firm in managing
global alliances, capturing lessons learned, and deploying
the experience in management of future alliances (Heimeriks
et al. 2007; Kale et al. 2002; Reuer et al. 2002). Although
extensive research has shown that alliances help firms
expand their knowledge and market base, the impact of
firms’ alliance activity on global innovation generation at
the firm level remains unexplored. Likewise, although prior
research has suggested that global innovation generation
between partners commonly occurs in alliances, it has not
yet been shown that an increase in the level of alliances
leads to an increase in the level of global innovation
generation. Several scholars (Hagedoorn 2002; Powell
1998; Powell et al. 1996) have pointed out that R&D
alliances between firms are particularly useful when the
industries are high-tech and facing rapid technological
change. Multiple alliances for different knowledge domains
are flexible and effective in creating cross-border knowledge
for the focal firm.
Thus, following a KBV perspective, we expect that the
level of global alliances is positively related to the level of
global innovation generation. First, the interaction between
international alliance partners can directly result in global
innovation generation because of knowledge transfer from
one partner to the other (e.g., Dhanaraj et al. 2004; Simonin
2004). Such knowledge transfer creates new knowledge,
such as in the case of NPD collaboration. Second, because
alliances increase firms’ knowledge base, they indirectly
enhance firms’ incentives to grow internationally (Buckley
and Casson 1976; Kogut and Zander 1993).
Experience with several alliance partners exposes the
focal firm to a range of product and market conditions
(Anand and Khanna 2000) and enhances its learning with
regard to managing alliances. Cohen and Levinthal (1990)
call this the “learning to learn” ability. Firms develop
routines in terms of both learning and teaching their
alliance partners how to work with them on projects.
If a focal firm has had more alliances in the past, it most
likely developed routines, systems, and strategies to
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facilitate global innovation generation. According to TCA
and the KBV, alliance partners become better at sharing,
learning, and developing innovations in the subject domain
of the alliance. Thus, we capture this increased ability for
global innovation generation due to the number of past
alliances as follows:
H5: As the number of partners in a firm’s past alliance
increases, global innovation generation increases.
Diversity of partners and global innovation generation The
diversity of partners occurs when partners of an alliance are
new and have no prior experience with a specific partner. In
this case, following a KBV perspective, the focal partner is able
to “explore” new knowledge (March 1991) that the diverse
partner brings to the alliance. In contrast, similar or repeated
partnering offers firms the opportunity to “exploit” any
overlapping knowledge (March 1991) that results in improve-
ments in performance or lowering of cost. As mentioned
previously, Christensen (1997) discovered that entire supplier
industries can became extinct because of the actual or
perceived inability of existing partnerships to solve a problem
in a technologically changing environment. In the hard disk
drive industry, Christensen found that new industries were
established that successively replaced the eight- and five-inch
supply industry with smaller sizes and superior performance.
Relatedly, according to Wuyts et al. (2004), similar partners
reduce the financial impact of global innovations.
According to the principles of TCA, working with the
same partners involves low transaction costs because routines
are familiar to both parties. However, new partners involve
high transaction costs because both firms must learn about
each other and how to work together (Sampson 2005).
Conversely, the KBV of the firm suggests that diverse
partners bring different knowledge sets to the alliance and
that there is low knowledge redundancy (Sivakumar and
Roy 2004). New partners help in the exploration of new
knowledge (March 1991) and can potentially lead to greater
global innovation generation. However, the same partners
would bring no new knowledge to the relationship or would
have high knowledge redundancy. Given the contradictory
predictions of TCA theory and the KBV, we offer the
following alternate hypotheses to summarize our theorizing:
H6a: As the diversity of partners increases, global innova-
tion generation increases.
H6b: As the diversity of partners increases, global
innovation generation decreases.
Alliance governance and global innovation generation
Vertical alliances versus horizontal alliances and global
innovation generation Vertical alliances refer to alliances
with upstream or downstream supply chain partners, and
they reduce transaction costs. These partners are not
competitors and either buy from or sell to the focal firm.
Vertical alliances (as opposed to horizontal alliances)
generally involve more interdependence among the firms
that may facilitate knowledge transfer and innovation (Roy
and Sivakumar, in press). Although several factors deter-
mine the nature of interdependence between firms, other
things being equal, we argue that vertical alliances exhibit
more dependence than horizontal alliance. The marketing
or selling side of the firm is focused on expanding its
market share in certain market segments and attempts to
pitch its offerings to the buying side of its potential
customers. In contrast, the focal firm’s purchasing and
procurement personnel are at the receiving end of potential
suppliers’ new ideas and thus can frequently come up with
new ideas themselves. Thus, innovation involves activity at
the supply or upstream end of focal firms.
Low knowledge redundancy is important if innovation is
to occur (Bower and Christensen 1995; Chandy and Tellis
2000), in line with the KBV. Only when the focal firm is
exposed to different knowledge sets can it become aware of
the possibilities of creating a dominant design (Anderson and
Tushman 1990) or, conversely, miss technological opportuni-
ties if there is too much knowledge redundancy (Christensen
1997). Thus, a pharmaceutical R&D lab might collaborate
with another lab across borders for conducting assays on
some compound it might develop. Zhao and Luo (2005) find
that vertical alliances enhance the innovation generation
between partners. Therefore, we hypothesize the following:
H7: As the proportion of vertical alliances relative to the
total number of alliances increases (compared to
horizontal alliances), global innovation generation
increases.
JVs versus other alliances and global innovation
generation Joint ventures are a special type of alliance
in which both partners have an equity stake and their
relationship is governed not only by contract but also by
ownership and oversight of the JV. Until the 1990s,
innovation generation was primarily by way of technology
transfer from parent companies to JVs (Inkpen and
Beamish 1997; Lyles and Salk 1996), and scholars were
concerned with the kind of governance that might
facilitate the innovation generation.
With increased globalization (Lyles and Salk 1996), the
focus is now on JV alliances in which the innovation
generation occurs in both directions. That is, the direction
of knowledge flow changed from being one way (from
developed to developing countries) to being two way (from
developing to developed countries, and vice versa) in the
case, for example, of R&D work being outsourced. When
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the subsidiary company completes the R&D and patents are
registered abroad, we expect that the JV form of
governance allows for oversight, control, and monitoring
for enhanced innovation generation. The JV form of
governance allows for the reporting and control of the
subsidiary and is particularly conducive to defending and
enhancing intellectual property rights. Because of the
shared participation and governance mechanisms in JV
relationships, as well as the subsequent long-term nature
of the relationship, the knowledge transfer between firms
is facilitated and therefore results in global innovation
generation more so than other contractual arrangements.
Stated formally:
H8: As the proportion of JV alliances relative to the total
number of alliances increase, global innovation
generation increases.
Global innovation generation and financial performance
of the focal firm
Thus far, we have developed hypotheses that link the
alliance expertise (number of alliances and diversity of
partners) and alliance governance (JVs and vertical/hori-
zontal alliances) with the level of firms’ global innovation
generation. A key question is whether global innovation
generation enhances the level of firms’ financial perfor-
mance over time and whether there is a shape that can
predict this performance. To answer this question, we first
consider KBV and the S curves of innovation as they
pertain to performance. We then examine the prediction of
TCA and its derivative relationship theory on firm
performance over time.
Although innovation generation improves performance
(Makino and Delios 1996) and shows evidence of
increase in financial results (Page 1993), the S curve
notion of innovation suggests that when alliance partners
work together on the same technological platform,
efficiencies increase and costs decrease as knowledge is
deployed in practice. Over time, the S curve begins to
plateau. That is, no more process improvements are
possible on the technology platform. Next, however, a
new technology platform is introduced (Anderson and
Tushman 1990), and as the focal firm moves to the new S
curve, it starts with much higher costs. Sood and Tellis
(2005) suggest that the S curve follows a pattern from
introduction to growth to maturity. Conceptually, we argue
that a successive number of S curves facing a focal firm
will result in an inverted U shape of financial performance
over time.
Relationship marketing following TCA (Dwyer et al.
1987) suggests that buyer-seller relationships go through
the phases of awareness, exploration, expansion, decline,
and dissolution, or an inverted U shape. Thus, the alliances
we consider herein should follow a similar normal or
inverted U-type curve from a performance point of view,
ignoring knowledge and innovation consideration. There-
fore, on the basis of the relationship marketing enhance-
ment of TCA and considerations of KBV, we hypothesize
the following:
H9: Global innovation generation has an inverted U-
shaped relationship to financial performance. As
global innovation generation increases, financial
performance increases up to a point beyond which
the financial performance decreases.
Table 1 summarizes the theoretical rationales for the
hypotheses.
Methodology
We wanted to test the research hypotheses in an important
industry setting that also helps us conduct a focused
hypotheses testing. Therefore, we used the pharmaceutical
industry to study global innovation generation in the
context of strategic alliances. The pharmaceutical industry
is also a knowledge-intensive industry (Prabhu et al. 2005;
Sorescu et al. 2003) in which alliances have been studied
(e.g., Baum et al. 2000; Rothaermel 2001) in the context of
biotechnology. The pharmaceutical industry primarily uses
patenting in different countries to defend its intellectual
property and to prevent competitors from copying products
(Cohen et al. 2002). In addition, pharmaceutical firms’
primary motive to patent abroad is to increase income from
new markets either by direct marketing or through licensing
their patents (Archibugi and Iammarino 2002). Moreover,
health care in general and the pharmaceutical industry in
particular are considered important sectors of the world
economy and that importance is only going to become more
prominent in the near future.
Data
We collected the data on corporate cross-border alliance,
global patent registration, and firm financial performance
from three different sources that have been used exten-
sively in marketing, finance, and related fields. Because
the focus of our study is on cross-border alliances, we
began by examining all pharmaceutical firms in Thomson
Security Data Corporation’s (SDC) alliance database. This
database uses information from the Securities and Ex-
change Commission filings and its international counter-
parts, trade publications, and other wire and news sources.
The SDC is a comprehensive alliance data source that is
most commonly used in empirical studies published in
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Table 1 Summary of theories and their use in the development of hypotheses
Hypothesis Theory Use of theory to justify hypotheses
H1: As the number of partners in the focal firm’s past alliances
increases, the total effect on financial performance increases.
(1) RBV (1) Alliance expertise enables the focal firm to assemble and
deploy partner capabilities more easily than those who do not
have alliance expertise.
(2) TCA (2) Partner skills and resources (RBV) when assembled and
deployed frictionless at low cost (TCA), lead to better financial
performance for the focal firm.
H2: As the diversity of partners in a firm’s past alliances increases,
the total effect on financial performance increases.
(1) RBV (1) Diversity of partners brings complementary skills and
capabilities to the focal firm and also enhances the ability
of the focal firm to manage diverse partners.
(2) TCA (2) With the ability to quickly assimilate a diverse partner
(RBV) at low cost (TCA), there is more flexibility in operations
and better financial performance.
H3: As the proportion of vertical alliances relative to the total
number of alliances increases (compared to horizontal alliances),
the total effect on financial performance increases.
(1) TCA (1) Vertical alliances (vs. horizontal alliances) reduce
opportunism and increase trust, enabling a focal firm to
experience higher firm performance.
(2) RBV (2) Vertical alliances (vs. horizontal alliances) provide the context
in which critical exchange of complementary skills can occur.
Consequently, the focal firm’s performance is expected to
increase.
H4: As the proportion of JV alliances relative to the total number
of alliances increases, the total effect on financial performance
increases.
(1) RBV (1) JVs (vs. other alliances) provide a structure in which
complimentary skills and capabilities can be combined to
generate value-creating resources. Also, it brings rhythm to
teamwork over time. Consequently, firm performance is
expected to increase.
(2) TCA (2) JVs (vs. other alliances) provide the context in which strong
social contracts through board control between the firms can be
developed. The social contract reduces opportunism, resulting in
an improvement in the financial performance of the focal firm.
H5: As the number of partners in a firm’s past alliance increases,
global innovation generation increases.
(1) KBV (1) Knowledge-based resources are difficult to imitate and
embedded in organizational cultures, systems and routines.
(2) TCA (2) The number of alliance increases the chance that
the focal firm will learn the new routines and consequently,
improving the chance of generating global innovations.
H6a: As the diversity of partners increases, global innovation
generation increases.
(1) KBV (1) Diversity of partners leads the focal firm to low knowledge
redundancy. When new knowledge is combined with existing
knowledge, global innovation increases.
H6b: As the diversity of partners increases, global innovation
generation decreases.
(2) TCA (2) Diversity of partners increases transaction costs and it is too
difficult to resolve the different knowledge sets that come to the
alliance.
H7: As the proportion of vertical alliances relative to the total
number of alliances increases (compared to horizontal alliances),
global innovation generation increases.
KBV Vertical alliances (versus horizontal alliances) reduce knowledge
redundancy. Thus, the chance of innovation generation
increases.
H8: As the proportion of JV alliances relative to the total number
of alliances increase, global innovation generation increases.
KBV Since knowledge is difficult to imitate and is embedded in
organizational routines, JVs provide a structure that better
facilitates knowledge transfer by creating closer and more formal
interactions between the firms. Consequently, innovation
generation is expected to increase.
H9: Global innovation generation has an inverted U-shaped
relationship to financial performance. As global innovation
generation increases, financial performance increases up to
a point beyond which the financial performance decreases.
(1) KBV (1) Knowledge transfer between firms results in increased
efficiencies in the same technology platform after which
efficiencies decrease in the new platform.
(2) TCA (2) Alliances, as marketing relationships, go through an inverted
U shaped relationship pattern, leading to the hypothesis that the
relationship between the innovation and the focal firm’s
performance will follow a similar pattern.
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top business and management journals (Schilling 2009).
We chose the 1985–2008 period for our study (a 24-
year period provides sufficient representation of global
alliances).
To obtain data to measure the global innovation
generation of the firms under study, we collected
information on both the issued U.S. and the global patents
for the studied period from the European Patent Office.
Finally, we obtained the metrics on the firms’ financial
performance from COMPUSTAT, including the focal
measure of Tobin’s q and other variables (e.g., sales,
R&D expenses).
We limited our data to firms that have frequent
occurrence of cross-border alliances (nine or more within
the study period; i.e., a minimum of one cross-border
alliance every 3 years on average). Collectively, our sample
contains 20 publicly traded U.S. firms with a sample size of
353. Each observation is firm-year combination. For
example, for Abbott Laboratories, our dataset has 23
observations, one per year, from 1986 to 2008 (we use lag
term, and thus the data in our analysis start from 1986 instead
of 1985). The Abbott Laboratories-2000 EXPERIENCE
variable is the cumulative number of cross-country alliances
as of 2000 for the company. Table 2 shows the detailed
variable operationalization and data sources. Table 3
displays the summary statistics and the correlations among
all key variables.
The global innovation generation model
We consider global patents a proxy for global innovation
generation. Ahuja (2000) maintains that patents are an
important indicator of inventiveness, and Narin et al. (1987)
find that patents are an excellent indicator of technological
strength. Although Prabhu et al. (2005) measure innovation
in the pharmaceutical industry as the number of phase I
products, they use patents as an indicator of knowledge.
Mansfield (1986) finds that 80% of patentable innovations
in pharmaceuticals are patented. By using patents as a
proxy for innovation generation, we extend the industrial
notion of innovation generation as adaptation by buyer and
seller (Hakansson and Snehota 1989; Roy et al. 2004) to
knowledge intensive industries such as pharmaceuticals
operating globally. In the industrial age, changes within the
technology platform (Tushman and Anderson 1997) that
improved efficiency or reduced costs were considered
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innovations. However, in a global marketplace, knowledge
intensive firms file patents not only for radical innovations
but also for incremental innovations, to keep competitors at
bay. Firms file patents globally when they want to expand
their market into foreign countries through a form of
alliance that could include horizontal alliances involving
technology licensing, JVs, and vertical types of marketing
and R&D alliances (Archibugi and Iammarino 2002). In
addition, global patents based on R&D alliances speed up
the NPD cycle and can effectively tap a larger market to
rapidly harvest increasingly shorter product life cycles
(Archibugi and Iammarino 2002). A firm could also file a
patent in another country to prevent competitors from
entering the market and might never actually enter the
market itself. Our theorizing of global innovation genera-
tion includes all these possibilities and treats globalization
of innovation generation as a leading indicator of “staking
out” the claim of the focal firm in the foreign market.
Although the debate on an appropriate measure of global
innovation generation continues, Hagedoorn and Cloodt
(2003) provide a comprehensive study that measures
innovative performance in 1200 companies in four high-
tech sectors using (1) R&D inputs, (2) patent counts, (3)
patent citations, and (4) new product announcements. They
find that though these four indicators measure a latent
variable–innovation performance, there is a strong statisti-
cal overlap between the four indicators. The statistical
overlap is so strong that Hagedoorn and Cloodt suggest that
it is reasonable to measure innovation performance by any
of the measures.
Accordingly, we use the extent to which firms attain
international patents as an indicator of the cumulative level of
globalization of patents or a measure of global innovation
generation. Mathematically, the level of global innovation
generation can be written as GLOBALINNOVit ¼ logit
1 HOME PATENTitcum=GLOBAL PATENTitcumð Þ½ . The
term HOME PATENTitcum is the cumulative number of
U.S. patent registrations for firm i as of year t, and
GLOBAL PATENTitcum is the cumulative number of total
patent registrations throughout the world (including the
U.S.) for firm i as of year t. The logit transformation maps
the original ratio (bounded by 0 and 1) to a real line,
which then is appropriate for the use as a dependent
variable in regression analysis. The level of alliance
experience (EXPERIENCEit) is the number of cumulative
inter-firm cross-border partnerships that firm i has formed
as of year t.
Following the work of Wuyts et al. (2004), we measure
diversity of partners as DIVERSITYit ¼ NEWitcum=ð
ALLIANCEitcumÞ, where NEWcumit is the cumulative number
of new partner firms that firm i has had as of year t and
ALLIANCEitcum is the cumulative number of all alliances that
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a firm has, the higher is the level of diversity. In accordance
with Gulati (1995), we measure vertical alliances as
VERTICALitcum=ALLIANCEitcum, where VERTICALitcum
is the cumulative number of vertical collaborative projects
that firm i has formed as of year t. Vertical alliances are
concluded between firms in different Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) codes. The term JVit is the ratio of the
cumulative number of JVs that firm i has formed as of year t.
It is measured as JVitcum=ALLIANCEitcum, where JVitcum is
the cumulative number of JVs that firm i has formed as of
year t.
To control for variables that may affect global innovation
generation and financial performance of the focal firms, we
include variables for firm size (SIZEit) and R&D intensity
(R&Dit). The operationalization of the two variables are,
respectively, log of sales of firm i at year t (Wright et al.
2002) and the ratio of R&D expenses to total sales of firm i
at year t (Das and Teng 2000; Luo and Homburg 2007; Luo
et al. 2010).
The financial performance model
We use Tobin’s q (Q) as a measure of firm performance.
Tobin’s q has been used in marketing research to mea-
sure the financial impacts of variables such as brand
equity (Simon and Sullivan 1993), customer satisfaction
(Anderson et al. 2004), and strategic responses to new
technologies (Lee and Grewal 2004). We define Qit as the
ratio of firm i’s market value at year t to its replacement
cost at year t, and it can be written mathematically as
(market value of the firm’s common stock shares + book
value of the firm’s preferred stocks + book value of the
firm’s long-term debt + book value of the firm’s inventories
+ book value of the firm’s current liabilities–book value of
the firm’s current assets)/(book value of the firm’s total
assets) (Chung and Pruitt 1994; Morgan and Rego 2006,
2009). Thus, a higher value of Tobin’s q indicates the
higher value of a firm’s relative financial value adjusted
by its asset size. Tobin’s q serves as an important
measure of a firm’s market value in terms of forward-
looking stock market performance (Luo and Donthu
2006). We made a log transformation for the raw Tobin’s
q value to map the positive ratio to a real line before using
it as a dependent variable in regression analysis. We input
GLOBALINNOV and its quadratic term to study the effect
of diminishing return (inverted U shape) of global
innovation generation on Tobin’s q. Alliance character-
istics enter the equation to demonstrate their net/direct
contribution to financial performance beyond the indirect
effect through global innovation generation. We also
control for variables in the financial performance model
that are known to affect Tobin’s q, by including firm size
(SIZEit) and R&D intensity (R&Dit).
Model specification
From the previous discussion, we can write the two
estimated models as follows:
GLOBALINNOVit ¼ "g0 þ "g1 GLOBALINNOVit1ð Þ
þ "g2 EXPERIENCEitð Þ
þ "g3 DIVERSITYitð Þ
þ "g4 VERTICALitð Þ þ "g5 JVitð Þ
þ "g6 SIZEitð Þ þ "g7 R&Ditð Þ;
and
Qit ¼ "q0 þΣJ"YDjYDij þ "q1 Qit1ð Þ
þ "q2 GLOBALINNOVitð Þ
þ "q3 GLOBALINNOVitð Þ2 þ "q4 EXPERIENCEitð Þ
þ "q5 DIVERSITYitð Þ þ "q6 VERTICALitð Þ
þ "q7 JVitð Þ þ "q8 SIZEitð Þ þ "q9 R&Ditð Þ:
By definition, the GLOBALINNOV and Tobin’s q measures
are likely to be correlated over time (Corr[Qit, Qit–1]=0.73,
p<0.001; Corr[GLOBALINNOVit, GLOBALINOVit–1]=
0.89, p<0.001). The autoregressive model with one time
lag—that is, the AR(1) model run with key independent
variables (without the lag terms of the dependent variable)—
showed autocorrelation of the residual from the regression.
For the global innovation generation equation, the estimated
rho is 0.85 (p<0.001) with a Durbin–Watson statistic of
0.25. For the Tobin’s q equation, the estimated rho is 0.80 (p
<0.001) with a Durbin–Watson statistic of 0.44. To account
for the autocorrelation, we include a lag term of the
dependent variable in both equations in our time-series
formulation. The inclusion of past firm financial perfor-
mance enhances the prediction for current financial perfor-
mance while solving the issue of autocorrelation (Dechow et
al. 1998; Gruca and Rego 2005).
The inclusion of the year dummy YDij (j=1, 2,..., 22) in
the Tobin’s q equation serves two important purposes: to
obtain estimates free from the effect of time and to control
for unobserved heterogeneity before pooling the data. First,
these year dummies teased out the effect of time on the
dependent measures potentially incorporated in our study
variables. Some focal variables are correlated with ordinal
time (time=1 for 1986, 2 for 1987, and so on; corr
[EXPERIENCE, time]=0.55, p<0.001; corr[DIVERSITY,
time]=0.23, p<0.001; corr[VERTICAL, time]=0.20,
p<0.001). Therefore, because EXPERIENCE is partially a
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function of time, by including the time variable, our
estimated effects of the focal variables are free from the
time effects. The inclusion of year dummies controls both
the linear and non-linear time effects in the model and
purifies the estimated results for our study variables. It
improves the model fitting significantly with the likelihood
ratio test statistic of #2df¼22 ¼ 166:60, p<0.001.
Second, the inclusion of year dummies captures the
unobserved year-specific effects (see Arellano 2003;
Boulding 1990; Boulding and Christen 2003), which makes
our data poolable in the analysis. The likelihood ratio test
shows that after we include the year dummy variables, there
is no significant improvement in model fit to further include
firm indicators in capturing baseline (intercept) heteroge-
neity across firms (#2df¼19 ¼ 18:40, p=0.496). Similarly,
there is no need for the coefficients of our study variables
(other than the intercept and year dummies) to vary further
across time or over firms to capture potential unobserved
heterogeneity. The likelihood ratio tests show insignificant
improvement for the model fitting for the random time
effects model (#2df¼9 ¼ 3:10, p=0.960) and random firm
effects model (#2df¼9 ¼ 0:30, p=1.000) after we include the
year dummies in adjusting the baseline time effects. In
summary, after we include the year dummies, there are no
estimation issues related to unobserved heterogeneity
across time and over firms.
For the global innovation generation equation, the
likelihood ratio tests show that there is no need to include
year dummies (#2df¼22 ¼ 29:00, p=0.145) or firm indica-
tors (#2df¼19 ¼ 14:40, p=0.760). The Hausman test is also
in favor of a fixed-effects model over a random-effects
model (random time effect model; #2df¼7 ¼ 15:93, p=
0.026; random firm effects model: #2df¼7 ¼ 14:65, p=
0.041). Therefore, we do not include year dummy, firm
indicator, or any form of random effect in this equation, and
it is appropriate to pool the data for study.
In our model, all key independent variables—namely,
GLOBALINNOV (in the Tobin’s q equation only),
EXPERIENCE, DIVERSITY, VERTICAL, and JV—are
measures of the same year as the dependent variables. In
addition, the model captures two longitudinal effects. The
independent variables have a contemporary and direct
effect on the dependent measures of the same year. Equally
important, they also have a lagged and indirect impact on
dependent measures for future years through the lag
structure in the model (i.e., the lag term of the dependent
variable in each equation). For example, global innovation
generation is modeled as having timely impact on firm
financial performance of the same period. Furthermore, our
model allows for an effect on firms’ financial performance
for the subsequent years as well (Deng et al. 1999) because
of the stickiness captured with the lag term of Tobin’s q.
This lag term serves as an inertia and amplifier effect in the
model, which carries the current year’s effect of global
innovation generation to future periods. This modeling of
lag structure reflects the belief that it takes time to fully
commercialize patent output from an alliance. Current
global innovation generation is determined by both current
and past alliance characteristics. By the same token, it takes
time to completely materialize global innovation generation
and alliance in firm performance. Current Tobin’s q is
determined by both current and past global innovation
generation and alliance characteristics. The coefficients for
both the lag term and the key independent variables jointly
decide the magnitude of the lag effects of the key variables
under study.
Two-stage least squares estimation
To account for the dual role of GLOBALINNOV as both a
dependent variable and a predictor in the two-equation
analysis, we must estimate these two equations simulta-
neously. We performed a Hausman test (Greene 2003;
Hausman 1978) and validated the endogeneity of the
predictors GLOBALINNOVit and (GLOBALINNOVit)
2 in
the model with a chi-square statistic of 6.29 (df=2,
p=0.043). Therefore, we used the two-stage least squares
approach to estimate the simultaneous equation system
while correcting the endogeneity problem (Greene 2003;
Gujarati 2004; Wooldridge 2001).
The control variable SIZE is correlated highly with the
key variables under study (e.g., Corr[EXPERIENCE,
SIZE]=0.40, p<0.001; Corr[DIVERSITY, SIZE]=0.10,
p=0.065; Corr[JV, SIZE]=0.43, p<0.001). To account for
this, we regressed SIZE on all four key alliance variables
(i.e., EXPERIENCE, DIVERSITY, VERTICAL, and JV)
and then entered the residual from this regression as the
SIZE variable. This orthogonalization guarantees the
independence of SIZE with the key variables in the model
while maintaining the model’s explanatory power (e.g.,
Morgan and Rego 2009). It also makes good managerial
sense because the new SIZE variable captures the true
operational size of the firm (sales) net of the effects of the
alliance.
Other methodological details
In order to increase the methodological rigor and robustness
of our study, we adopted a number of methodological steps.
In the interest of space, we just briefly discuss some these
procedures without providing additional details.
Due to the high correlation between some alliance
characteristics and time, a concern is whether time might
be the underlying driver for the dependant measures,
permeating through the key variables in the model. To
address this concern, we compared models with and
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without time/year information in different formats, such as
ordinal variables and dummy indicators. Based on the
results, we included time information as year dummies in
the Tobin’s q equation to best account for the effect of time.
As to time lags, we tried different lag period between
predictors (0–3 years) and Tobin’s q and find that the
results are consistent across different options. Moreover, the
1-year lag choice provides us with the best model fitting
and interpretation.
Analysis using alternative variables for Tobin’s q
Despite its widespread use, Tobin’s q as a financial measure
has certain limitations, such as the random-walk contami-
nation of the measure, the stationarity of the measure, and
the difficulty in computation of intangible assets (Mizik and
Jacobson 2009; Srinivasan and Hanssens 2009). However,
no single measure can be perfect without any limitation. In
validating our findings on global innovation generation’s
effect on firm financial performance, we ran similar models
on two other commonly used financial metrics—namely,
price-to-book ratio and cash flow from operations—which
measure firm financial performance from different perspec-
tives (Gruca and Rego 2005; Srinivasan and Hanssens
2009). Price-to-book ratio, which is measured as the ratio of
market value to the book value of common equity, is a
forward-looking measure of a firm’s market value, provid-
ing market-based views of investor expectations of the
firm’s future profit potential (Srinivasan and Hanssens
2009). Net present value of future cash flow has long been
proposed as the value of a firm to shareholders (Rappaport
1986) because marketing scholars treated future cash flow
as an appropriate measure of shareholder value (Srivastava
et al. 1998, 1999). These follow-up studies serve as a
robustness check to validate our findings of the effects of
global innovation generation on firm financial performance
and shareholder value. The results are consistent with the
results using Tobin’s q and not presented in the article in the
interest of space.
Results
Table 4 presents the parameter estimation results for the
global innovation generation and financial performance
models. To verify H1–H4, we compute the total effect of
the alliance characteristics on financial performance using
two components: (1) a direct effect as manifested by the
coefficients in the financial performance model and (2) an
indirect effect as manifested by both the coefficients in the
global innovation generation model and the coefficients of
the global innovation generation variables in the financial
performance model.
The total effect of target variable X (which can be
EXPERIENCE, DIVERSITY, ALLIANCE, or JV) can be
calculated as a partial derivative of Tobin’s q. That is:
Q_ Xð Þit ¼ "q2  "gX þ 2 "q3  "gX  GLOBALINNOVit þ "qX;
where βgX and βqX are coefficients of variable X in the
GLOBALINNOV and Tobin’s q equation, respectively. In
addition, βq2 and βq3 are coefficients for GLOBALINNOV
and (GLOBALINNOV)2 from the Tobin’s q equation,
respectively.
From this equation, we know that the total effect of
alliance characteristics on Tobin’s q is non-linear and varies
with the value of GLOBALINNOV. We conduct a
Table 4 Two-equation structural model estimation results
Variable Raw estimates Standardized estimates
Globeinnov Equation
lag GLOBALINNOV 0.702 (0.023)*** 0.808***
Experience 0.005 (0.002)*** 0.066***
Diversity −0.523 (0.141)*** −0.095***
Vertical −0.101 (0.108) −0.026
JV 0.647 (0.166)*** 0.102***
Size 0.086 (0.021)*** 0.129***





lag Q 0.764 (0.035)*** 0.770***
GLOBALINNOV 0.080 (0.038)** 0.177**
Sq(GLOBALINNOV) −0.013 (0.006)** −0.167**
Experience 0.000 (0.001) 0.001
Diversity 0.061 (0.084) 0.025
Vertical 0.029 (0.058) 0.017
JV −0.110 (0.097) −0.038
Size −0.031 (0.013)** −0.102**




Estimates for intercept and year dummies are omitted but available on
request.
SIZE is the adjusted SIZE after controlling for its correlation with the
other independent variables.
Variables entered as instrument variables for GLOBALINNOV and
(GLOBALINNOV)2 in the Tobin’s q Equations are lag GLOBALINNOV,
(lag GLOBALINOV)2 , Experience, Diversity, Vertical, JV, Total assets,
SG&A, Size, R&D, and Year.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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sensitivity analysis and summarize the findings in Table 5.
Alliance experience and JV have a positive total effect on
Tobin’s q when the level of global innovation generation is
low or medium. However, the positive effect weakens as
the level of global innovation generation increases. With
high levels of global innovation generation, the effect
becomes negative. Therefore, H1 and H4 are supported for
low to moderate levels of global innovation generation
(which is a majority of our sample). Diversity shows the
reversed pattern; it has a total negative effect on Tobin’s q
when the level of global innovation generation is low or
medium. However, the negative effect weakens as the level
of global innovation generation increases, and it becomes
positive when the level of global innovation generation is
high. Thus, H2 is supported at high levels of global
innovation generation. Given the lack of statistical signif-
icance of VERTICAL in both models, vertical alliance has
no significant impact on Tobin’s q. Therefore, H3 is not
supported.
In the global innovation generation equation, global
innovation generation from the last period has a positive
impact on the current year’s global innovation generation,
which validates the previous finding of autocorrelation
(β=.702, p<.001). The results show that alliance experi-
ence positively influences the level of global innovation
generation (β=.005, p=.007), in support of H5. Note that
for the role of partner diversity on global innovation
generation, we offered a two-part hypothesis with contra-
dictory predictions because of the differences in predictions
of the two theoretical perspectives. The level of partner
diversity shows a negative impact on global innovation
generation (β=−.523, p<.001). Thus, the results are
consistent with H6b but not with H6a. H7 is not supported,
which maintains that vertical collaboration enhances the
level of global innovation generation (β=−.101, p=.347);
H8 is supported because the number of JVs are positively
related to global innovation generation (β=.647, p<.001).
For the control variables, both firm size (β=.086, p<.001)
and R&D intensity (β=.389, p<.001) positively influence
global innovation generation.
For the financial performance model, Tobin’s q of the
last year positively influences the current year’s Tobin’s q,
which is consistent with our previous finding of autocor-
relation (β=.764, p<.001). The main effect of the level of
global innovation generation on financial performance is
significantly positive (β=.080, p=.034), but its quadratic
effect is significantly negative (β=−.013, p=.049). The
results suggest that there is an inverted U-shape relationship
between the level of global innovation generation and
firms’ financial performance, providing support for H9.
Table 5 Total effects of alliance characteristics on financial performance
GLOBALINNOV Raw Value −0.50 −0.04 0.42 0.88 1.34 1.80 2.26 2.72 3.18 3.64 4.10
Standardized
Value
−2.00 −1.60 −1.20 −0.80 −0.40 0.00 0.40 0.80 1.20 1.60 2.00
Experience Raw
Estimates
0.0004 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 −0.0001 −0.0001
Std.
Estimates
0.0557 0.0469 0.0380 0.0292 0.0204 0.0116 0.0028 −0.0060 −0.0148 −0.0236 −0.0324
Diversity Raw
Estimates
−0.0485 −0.0424 −0.0363 −0.0303 −0.0242 −0.0181 −0.0120 −0.0060 0.0001 0.0062 0.0123
Std.
Estimates
−0.0806 −0.0678 −0.0551 −0.0423 −0.0296 −0.0168 −0.0041 0.0086 0.0214 0.0341 0.0469
Vertical Raw
Estimates
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Std.
Estimates
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
JV Raw
Estimates
0.0599 0.0524 0.0449 0.0374 0.0299 0.0224 0.0149 0.0074 −0.0002 −0.0077 −0.0152
Std.
Estimates
0.0863 0.0726 0.0590 0.0453 0.0317 0.0180 0.0044 −0.0093 −0.0229 −0.0366 −0.0502
Non-significant coefficients are entered as 0 in calculation.
GLOBALINNOV is shown in two forms: raw value and standardized value calculated as (GLOBALINNOV – Mean GLOBALINNOV)/
SD(GLOBALINNOV).
Raw Estimates are calculated using raw coefficients and raw GLOBALINNOV value.
Std. Estimates are calculated using standardized coefficients and standardized GLOBALINNOV value.
Because of the rounding error, the signs of the overall effects calculated by raw and standardized estimates may be different.
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Alliance experience, diversity, vertical collaboration, and
JVs do not have a significant direct impact on financial
performance, because the estimates are all insignificant.
Discussion
In this section, we highlight the meaning and implications
of our findings for the conceptual understanding of
business-to-business alliances in cross-border settings. We
also delineate our study’s insights for managerial practice as
well as future research directions.
Theoretical implications
This research has several theoretical and substantive
implications for understanding inter-firm alliances, global
innovation generation, and financial performance. First, our
conceptualization incorporates the notion that innovation
generation in business-to-business relationships is an
important phenomenon that has a direct impact on the
financial well-being of the firm. Our argument also shows
that multiple theoretical frameworks help inform the link-
ages among alliance characteristics, innovation generation,
and financial performance. By incorporating multiple
theoretical frameworks, we tried to explore and shed some
light on the “why” and “how” of these linkages.
Second, this study contributes to research in the domain
of the KBV of the firm. Because innovation generation is
primarily a knowledge-based process, we shed more light
on the relationship between alliance characteristics and
cross-border knowledge transfer, the success of which
manifests in global innovation generation in general and
globalization of patents in particular. The findings show
that the value of a firm increases with the level of global
innovation generation up to a point; after that, the
relationship becomes negative. Therefore, the study pro-
vides empirical support for the notion that innovation
generation and firm growth are highly inter-linked (Kogut
and Zander 1993) but cautions that too much global
innovation generation may not be good for financial
performance of the focal firm.
Third, the study contributes to the alliance literature in
business-to-business relationships. Recent work has sug-
gested that alliances weakly contribute to firms’ financial
value (Gupta and Mirsa 2000). In contrast global innova-
tion generation could be the missing link between alliance
and financial performance because our study shows that the
influence of alliance governance on firm financial perfor-
mance exists mainly indirectly through innovation genera-
tion. Thus, our finding provides important insights into the
manifestation of alliance characteristics on innovation
generation and financial performance.
Though theoretically predicted, we note the insignificant
results for the type of alliances (vertical vs. horizontal) on both
the equations (hypothesis H7). Although further research in
other industries and other settings (e.g., domestic alliances)
may shed more light on the phenomenon, an explanation for
these results is that in the case of pharmaceutical industry,
some of the vertical alliances may involve very diverse
industries (medical device vs. drug formulation) that may
mask the interdependence in business relationships.
Managerial implications
This study also contributes to managerial practice by offering
some useful insights for managers involved in the manage-
ment of cross-border alliances. The findings suggest that
alliances are an important driver of innovation generation and
that inter-firm alliances play a crucial role in firm financial
performance. However, the findings also show that innovation
generation is not easy to manage; therefore, managers must
recognize that knowledge transfer needs to be strategically
planned and properly leveraged to yield superior financial
performance (Zhao and Luo 2005). This research finds that
firms must actively develop alliance expertise and alliance
governance to increase innovation generation and the
underlying knowledge transfer. Innovation generation is an
important variable for firm financial performance.
Similarly, managers must realize that the characteristics of
alliance partners should be considered holistically, in which
the number of alliances and the diverse partnering at the firm
level are considered simultaneously. Selection of an alliance
partner can no longer be based on consideration of an
individual firm as a potential partner; the mix of partners
and agreement types must be carefully managed. The type of
partnering is also an important variable of this research. Firms
should attempt to have a greater mix of JV-type partnerships,
which in turn should lead to greater innovation generation.
The second-stage results of our model suggest that
global innovation generation is good for financial perfor-
mance of the focal firm up to a point, but increased
innovation generation might be counterproductive to
financial performance beyond that point. Therefore, man-
agers should balance the need for global patents with the
availability of alliance partners that can execute the firm’s
mission. In addition, equity JVs enhance firm financial
performance only through innovation generation. This
result underscores the importance of a careful deployment
of alliance outcomes that are related to alliance character-
istics. In addition, the importance of the strategic thrust of
the focal firm may vary during its life cycle, and thus to
optimize financial performance, managers must carefully
align the firm strategic objectives with the alliance
characteristics to result in the desired level of global
innovation generation.
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Directions for further research
Our conceptual framework and empirical analysis are
intended to offer an expanded view of innovation genera-
tion in business-to-business alliances. The findings also
suggest avenues for further research in this exciting
domain. Our findings clearly show that global innovation
generation is an important mediating variable that links
alliance characteristics and financial performance. This
finding leads to an important future research question
regarding whether other mediating factors affecting finan-
cial outcomes of alliance exist. Findings from such research
would lead to a better understanding of the impact of
alliances on firm financial performance.
We previously noted how the characteristics of the
pharmaceutical industry are relevant in explaining some of
the findings. We deliberately restricted our analysis to one
industry because we wanted to focus on a knowledge-based
industry and did not want our analysis to be confounded by
industry differences. Further research should try to tease out
the potential differences between the type of alliances (e.g.,
marketing vs. R&D alliances, R&D vs. manufacturing
alliances) to understand the role of these relationships in a
more fine-tuned way. Examining inter-industry differences
will be an important next step in this research domain.
Although patents are a reasonable measure of innovation
generation, there are a few limitations of the measure. For
example, patents may sometimes underestimate the true
innovative capacity of the firm because some inventions
cannot be patented, and firms may not patent some
inventions for strategic reasons (Cohen and Levin 1988;
Griliches 1990). More comprehensive measures must be
developed for innovation generation as research progresses
in this domain. Among the candidates are R&D inputs,
patent citations, and new product announcements. They,
together with patent counts, measure the innovative
performance from different angles, but show a strong
statistical overlap with the latent construct of innovative
performance (Hagedoorn and Cloodt 2003).
An important research extension worth exploring for
managerial insights is the relative importance of various
alliance characteristics in influencing global innovation
generation and financial performance and how this relation-
ship changes over time and across industries. Such fine-tuned
analysis would further help managers in structuring suitable
cross-border alliances over the life cycle of the firm. Using
qualitative research (e.g., organizational ethnography, case
studies), researchers could also examine the locus and
development of cross-border alliances during the evolution
of the focal firm’s globalization and its impact on financial
performance.
We focused on linking the alliance characteristics of the
focal firm with the aggregate level of global innovation
generation. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
study to focus on alliance characteristics and globalization
of patents at the aggregate level for the firm’s activities. The
next level of fine-grained analysis could focus on individual
country combinations as the unit of analysis and use that
combination to examine the joint patents as well as inter-
country alliances. Such an analysis would require more
detailed datasets.
Finally, further research might explore the role of cross-
border alliances in industries that are characterized by
different levels of market and/or technological turbulence.
On the one hand, cross-border alliances bring new
institutional knowledge, routines, and culture to face new
market demands; on the other hand, management of these
alliances and resultant organizational transformations may
take significant leadership and managerial resources to
establish, develop, and monitor those alliances. These
research issues must be addressed from an inter-
disciplinary perspective because disciplines such as mar-
keting, management, and information technology are all
relevant in examining the topics in turbulent environments.
Conclusion
We believe that in this age of increased global relationships
among firms and the advent of technology, inter-firm relation-
ships in knowledge-based tasks will become more important
in deciding the competitive advantage and financial perfor-
mance of firms. A fine-tuned understanding of the relation-
ships among alliance expertise, alliance governance, global
innovation generation, and financial performance and the
ability of the firms to manage these alliances will become
increasingly more important in the future.
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